This paper is concenled with heuristics for segmenting narratives into units that form the basic elements of discourse representations and that constrain the application of focusing algorithms. The following classes of di~ontinuities are identified: figure-ground, space, time, perspective, and topic. It is suggested that rhetorical relations between narrative units are mac~o labels that stand for frequently occurring clusters of discontinuities. Heuristics for identifying discontinuities are presented and illustrated in an extended example.
Introduction
Thi~; paper is concerned with heuristics for segmenting nar- Conversation can thus properly be called performative discourse.
By contrast, the content of a narrative is decoupled from the linear progression of its text and unfolds in its own, separate timeline.
It follows that in place of the situation of discourse, a narrative is processed with respect to a constantly maintained deictic center, which is "the locus in conceptual space-time of the objects and events depicted or described by the sentences currently being perceived. At any point in the narrative, the cognitive agent's attention is focused on particular characters (and other objects) standing in particular temporal and spatial relations to each other. Moreover, file agent 'looks' at the narrative from the perspective of a particular character, spatial location and temporal location. Thus the deictic center consists of a WHEREpoint, a WHEN-point and a WHO-point." (Bruder et at. 1986: 1) . In this paper, the WHEN-point of the deictic center is referred to as the Temporal Focus (cf. Webber 1987a,b; Nakhimovsky 1987b).
We conceive of discourse segments (DSs) as continuous stretches of text corresponding to relatively monolithic pieces of internal representation. What "relatively monolithic" means is the subject of much of the rest of the paper; at this point, we simply say that the DS remains the same as long as the deictic center does not undergo drastic changes in space, time, perspective or composition, while the beginning of a new DS is accompanied/signaled by a discontinuity in one or several of these parameters. Within each segment, reference and anaphora ate processed by local algorithms mostly relying on recency lists as in Sidner (1983) . At the beginning of a new DS, a more global search through the accumulated representation is required.
We thus have three kinds of entities organized into three kinds of structures: linearly ordered stretches of text forming the Linear Text Structure (LTS); the Event-Situation Structure (ESS, ef. Webber 1987b) , representing the narrative's unfolding contents; and the Current Focus Space, which is a collection of focusing mechanisms (including the deictic center) that together represent the "attentional state" (Grosz & Sidner 1986 ) of the system. The components of the LTS are frequently linked by rbetodcal relationg such as elaboration, resumption or flashback (see, e.g., Hobbs 1982) . We believe that these rhetorical relations are simply macro labels that stand for certain oft-repeated clusters of discontinuities in the ESS. It is the discontinuities that are essential for constructing the ESS; the rhetorical labels need not be recognized by the reader at all, just as, on the sentence 465 level, speech acts need not be recognized in order to understand the intention of the speaker (Cohen & Levesque 1987) .
The foregoing has sewed to motivate the need for reliable segmentation heuristics. Most such heuristics found in the iitera~ ture are syntactical in nature, relying, in almost Eliza-like fashion, on clue words and phrases (see references in Grosz & Sidner 1986: 177) . We pt~pose that heuristics should be based on semantical considerations such as discontinuities in the representation. This paper investigates four kinds of discontinuities: discontinuities of topic, discontinuities of space and time, discontinuities of figure and ground, and discontinuities of the narrative perspective. Section 2 explains what these are; the remainder of this section gives a preliminary and paltial illustration and reviews related work.
An example
Consider the following example:
(1) (a) Hartley and Phoebe had been sent by their mother to fix the tail vane of the windmill. (b) In the great expanse of the prairie where they live(I, the high tower of the windmill was the only teal landmark. (Worline 1956: 1) Rhetorically speaking, sentence (b) interrupts a sequence of events described in (a) (= DS1) to start DS2, a description, fit order to recognize this rhetorical relation between the two DSs, it is necessary to recognize that:
(1) there is a shift of topic;
(2) there is a shift in perceptual modality to visuai perception; (3) there is a shift in time scale ,from the events of the cun'ent day to years or decades, associated with the lifetime of a windmill and the 'where they lived' clause; (4) there is shift in Sl~tial scale from a household to the entire prairie; (5) there is a shift from a foregrounded sequence of events to the "mopping-up" operation of filling in the background; the shift is signaled by aspectual changes (Hopper 1978; Nakhimovsky 1987b Nakhimovsky , 1988 ; and (6) the foregrounded sequence of events includes two telic processes (walking fi'om rite house to the windmill; fixing the broken part) whose beginnings or preconditions are explicitly mentioned but whose terminal points are still in the future relative to the Temporal Focus; this sets up expectations for the reader.
The following empirical investigation is suggested by this and similar' examples: classify the discontinuities and clusters of discontinuities that typically accompany DS breaks in narratives; identify rite linguistic and extra-linguistic knowledge involved; develop heuristics for using this knowledge; and test the heuristics in a computer program. Section 2 below discusses nma-ative representations mid the data structures that ale needed for con.-structing and updating them. A classification of discontinuities falls out of this discussion. Section 3 presents several kinds of knowledge that we consider relevant for identifying discontinui-466 ties in narratives. Section 4 illustrates the colresponding heuristics with an extended example Whose point is that our heuristics explain the use of deietic devices attd con'ecfly predict paragraph breaks observed in existing narratives.'i
Related work
Centt~al to our investigation is the idea that text underst~md-ing involves "building a good structure" (Bruce 1981: 283) by the process of snccessive embedding of the cut~ent sentence representation into the stEa~cture created by the preceding text.
This idea emerged almost simultmleously in Computational
Linguistics/Al (Bruce 1981; Weber 1979 Weber , 1983 ) and linguistics (Kamp 1981 , Heim 1982 . (There has al~ been interaction, more o1' less conscious, with the Re,",der--Response school of literary criticism as represented in, e.g., Thompkins 1981 .) The main difference between these two developments concerns the role of inference and monotonicity: to what extent doe, s the structure being built incorporate defea.sible inferences that may have to be undone? We do not pursue this issue hele but assume non~-monotonic embeddability and an active role fbr expectations set up by the text. (Cf. N~himovsky 1988 for some discussion.) Grosz & Sidner (1986) is the first unified approach in which the problem of segmentation is fled up with the notion of atten.. tional state. As argued in Nakhimovsky (1987b) , some features of their model (a stack mechanism for attentional state, the prom~ inenee of pragmatic notions such as the speaker's intentions) make it more appropriate for conversation rather than na~cative~ Webber (1988) and Naidlimovsky (1988) The hypothesis of this project is that the eonstrtiction and modification of the deictic center is important fox ~ comprehension.
To test tiffs hypothesis, a computer system implemented in SNePS (Shapiro 1979 , Shapiro & Rapaport 1987 ) is being developed that wilt "read" a narrative and answer questions conrenting the reader's beliefs about the objects, relations, and events in ito "l~e system will be psychologically real, because the details of the algorithms and the efficacy of the linguistic devices will be validated by psychological experiments on nolmal ar, d abnormal comprehenders. ((~. Bruder et al. 1986 , Daniels 1986 , Ahneida 1987 , Wiebe & Rapapolt 1988 Thence is surprisingly little psychological work on discourse seganentation. To rem.edy this situation, a series of expelJments I" This is not to suggest timt tyl~ogmphical pacag~aph breaks are the only discontinuities we ate afar. First, ~t tile minimal level of segmentation, DSs are ust'tally smaller than typographical paragraphs. Second, a typographical paragraph does not simply sigJlat or suggest a discontinuity: it creates one by its reD' pJ'esenc.~;.
is being de,,;igned and condncted at Colgate (Reynolds & Nakhimovsky (in preparation) ). The gubjects are being asked to segment narratives of varions gemes and stpactural characteristics and later recall them, under conditions of both cued and uncued ~eeatl. We proceed from the hypothesis that narrative structures as they arc remembered are different from such strnctures as they are built "on line" in the process of comprehension.
2o Narrative~ and Their lltepr~ntatlon~. Th~ lost obsetvali~n to make is that a nan'ative must have a plot, i.e., p~e~ent ~ sequ~mce of events that forms an inslamce of a recognizable pattern. (The patto-n.,; are part universal, part culture-.specific; the work of Lehnert (1982) and Alker et al. i In spoken narratives about eve~L,; that (axe presented its having) ac.. ta~lly oecun'ed, rite namator nmy occ~L~ionally make ~eference to the time of discom'se (by b,-.ginnh~g a new discotlrse segment with, e.g., "Then, yesterday, 1 ran into 8mid~ mid he told me..."); however, oven in |his case, hltegration with ttie previously narrated events is obligatory.
(1985) can be seen as a search for the principles on which such patterns are built.) Using Gestalt terminology (brought into linguistics by Tahny (1983)), we can say that a narrative's plot must present a recognizable temporal/eansal figure shown against some ground that minimally consists of spatial/visual settings (descriptions of characters are also frequent). The distinction is not always clear-cut, because elements of the figure can be hidden among the details of the ground, but the temporal nature of the plot does stand in clear contrast to the spatial nature of the ground.
Secondly, a narrative must have characters with whom we empathize. These characters don't have to be human: one Can easily imagine a story about an adventuresome plant seed that falls off its parent, gets swallowed and excreted by a horse, and nearly drowns in a tropical rain before being miraculously saved by the sun and producing a flower. Even so, the narrative is likely to alternate between die objective narrator's point of view and that of one of the characters. ("The belly of the horse was dark and noisy inside.") Suppose for a moment that the ESS is implemented as a partitioned network of nodes, each node representing a narrated htoken and partitions corresponding to the belief spaces of the characters. An unfolding narrative then creates a path through the network such that it, and the inferences it generates, covers the network in its entirety. Some discontinuities of narratives very simply reflect the inlrinsic spatial or temporal discontinuities of the plot, e.g., when the story is composed of a sequence of events taking place during an afternoon, followed by two years' hiatus, followed by another action-packed afternoon. (A similar example of a spatial discontinuity can be easily imagined.) One measure of the "simplicity" of a narrative is how faithfully the order and stntcturing of its text reflects the order and structuring of its component events. Even in the simplest narrative, how~ ever, there are bound to be discontinuities resulting from the tension between the linear nature of the text and the multidimensional structure that it is meant to evoke. These are discontinuities of figure and ground, when the narrative shifts between the main story-line and the surrounding circumstance, and discontinuities of perspective, when the narrative crosses into a different "empathy partition" or creates a new one.
Given this classification of discontinuities, one can proceed to catalog the clues that signal them. This is a subject for a large empirical study, of which the next section is but a preliminary sketch. It is important to keep in mind that it is clusters of discontinuities that signal the beginning of a new DS.
Discontinuities in Narratives.

Topic discon[inuities.
Discontinuities of topic faLl into two groups. In the first, there is no anaphoric relation or immediate inference path from the new topic to a node in the Current Focus Space. What an "immediate inference path" is depends, of course, on the system's knowledge base and inferential capabilities, but this is a 467 separate issue that is not dealt with in this paper. Of more interest to us is the second kind of discontinuity, when an anaphoric relation exists and calls for a pronominal anaphor, but the WHO-point is instead reintroduced by a full noun phrase, e.g. The most obvious spatial discontinuities are discontinuities of scale. It is argued at some length in Nakhimovsky (1986 Nakhimovsky ( , 1987a ) that h-types have time scales associated with them, characterized in terms of "received" cyclical events such as day or year. It seems equally necessary to establish a gradation of spatial scales, based on similar considerations from human biology and habitat. The spatial scales we currently employ are:
one's body (which may need to be further specialized); within arm's reach; room area, such as desk or bed; room; floor; house;
household; village/neighborhood; larger area within a betweenmeals round trip; within a day's round trip; staying overnight.
(The larger the scale, the more domain-and culture-specific vailation there is.)
A change in spatial scale is frequently accompanied by related phenomena such as a change in temperature or lighting:
(3) She changed her blouse too and, as she stood before the mirror, she thought of how she used to dress for mass on Sunday morning when she was a young girl; and she looked with quaint affection at the diminutive body which she had so often adorned. In spite of its years she found it a nice tidy little body.
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When she got outside the streets were shining with rain and she was glad of her old brown raincloak.
Perspective discontinuities.
The following signals frequently indicate a shift to a character's subjective perspective away from the objective perspective of the implied narrator: (a) attitude reports, which can be further subeategorized into beliefs, desires, emotions, and so on; communication verbs; and perceptions; and (b) deictics.
Attitude reports, by their very nature, introduce private semantic objects into the ESS and thus create, or move into, a partition.
Deictics, such as the verbs bring or come, indicate the position of the WHO-point of the deictie center; a shift of this position to one of the characters signals a discontinuity. (Cf. Banfield 1982 , Wiebe & Rapaport 1988 4. An Example.
This section of the paper applies the above heuristics to the initial fragment of Joyce's "Clay' '. The fragment falls into three DSs: sentence 1 (DS1), sentences 2-6 (DS2), and sentences 6-12 (DS3).t Embedded in DS3 is DS3.1, consisting of sentences 9.. 10. Sentence 13 starts a fourth DS by returning to the first one. The hegira,Aug of" DS3.1 is signaled by a well-known clue phrase
One day and by the past-perfect tense. Note that the material is still gronnd ('Mmia is such that...'). "the precise relationship between I)S3 and DS3.1 is at this p~fint ambiguous: they cmt be siblings, a ltd they wouM be if sentences 11 and 12 were dropped fi'om the nmxafive. Howevcr~ sentence 11 clearly signals a returu to the material of sentences 6-8: the tense changes back from past perfect to past (past progressive, presumably for a sharper contrast with the perfect), and the adverb always, used in sen° tences 7 and 8, reappears again. 'Ibis establishes that DS3.1 is, indeed, embedded in DS3; note that it bears no relation to DS1, and, in pmticular, the pastq~erfect events of sentences 9-10 are much fm'ther in the past (on a different time scale) than the past perfect events of sentence 1.
The tJ ansition from 12 to 13 (the next paragraph break) is a retina to the event sequence of senteuce 1. The position of the TF, amt the entire deictic center is indicated by the future-in-the~ past tense. Note that it is essential to retrieve the entire deictic center, and not just the 'I'I,', because the WHO-point is also restored: the she in 13 does not evoke Maria of sentence 12 or any other sentence in DS 2 and 3 presented from the perspective of the implied narrator. Rather, this pronoun is a quasi-indexical (Rapaport 1986 ) that replaces the first-person singular I of Maria's fit, mghts and expectations, signaled by Maria looked forward in sentence 1.t 5. Future research.
There: are several directions in which we are proceeding. Wiebe & Rapaport (1988) and Wiebe (in progress) present an outline of a detailed computational investigation of narrative perspecfive and reference. Reynolds & Nakhimovsky (in preparation) will report on several psychological experiments designed to obtain empirical data on how people segment narratives in the process of reacting, and how they are segmented when recalled.
The deicti¢ center project (Bruder et at. (1986) ) contains both a linguistic t;tudy of the role of indexicals in narrative segmentation 1In contrast to the naive children's story of Example 1, it is difficult to make definite starements about the narrative perspective in Joyce. Even his early stories, anticipating the incoming medenfism, deli.-berately and skillfully blend the character's perspective with the implied ruartator's, so that even a descriptiou of Maria uses colloquial vocabulary and syntax that suggest a hum,'m voice that could l~e ouly Mafia's.
and a computational project that will test all the diverse segmentation he~wisties within the unifoma system of belief representa-.
tion.
